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We analyze the long-run growth effects of automation in the canonical overlapping
generations framework. While automation implies constant returns to capital within
this model class (even in the absence of technological progress), we show that it does
not have the potential to lead to positive long-growth. The reason is that automation
suppresses wages, which are the only source of investment because of the demographic
structure of the overlapping generations model. This result stands in sharp contrast to
the effects of automation in the representative agent setting, where positive long-run
growth is feasible because agents can invest out of their wage income and out of their
asset income. We also analyze the effects of a robot tax that has featured prominently
in the policy debate on automation and show that it could raise the capital stock and
per capita output at the steady state. However, the robot tax cannot induce a takeoff
toward positive long-run growth.
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Automation and its potential economic consequences have caught the attention of
economists, policymakers, and the general public over the last few years (see, for example,
The Economist, 2014; Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2016). While the number of industrial
robots that replace workers on assembly lines already took off in the 1990s (IFR, 2015)
and 3D printing technologies are already used to produce highly customized products
like hearing aids and prostheses (Abeliansky et al., 2015), driverless cars and lorries that
could revolutionize the transport business are currently being developed and tested. Fur-
theromore, automation is not confined to routine tasks that have long been considered as
susceptible to replacement by machines: devices based on machine learning are starting
to beat doctors in the accuracy of diagnosing diseases, reporters in the speed of writing
newsflashes, and even authors in writing books – at least for given parameters of content
and style (see Barrie, 2014).
On the one hand, there is widespread agreement that automation has a huge poten-
tial to raise economic well-being (Steigum, 2011; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2015; Graetz
and Michaels, 2015; He´mous and Olsen, 2016; Abeliansky and Prettner, 2017; Prettner,
2017). On the other hand, there are also concerns that automation could (at least partly)
be responsible for stagnating wages of low-skilled workers, a phenomenon that we have
observed in the United States over the past few decades (Frey and Osborne, 2013; Mishel
et al., 2015; Arntz et al., 2016; Murray, 2016; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017; Prettner
and Strulik, 2017). As a consequence, automation might be a major driver of the rise
in inequality that has been observed in many countries (Piketty and Saez, 2003; Piketty,
2014). On top of that, by relying on a numerical analysis, it has even been argued that
automation could lead to economic stagnation in the long run (Sachs and Kotlikoff, 2012;
Benzell et al., 2015; Sachs et al., 2015).
We aim to contribute to this debate along two lines. First, we show analytically that
the long-run economic growth effects of automation crucially depend on the underlying
framework that is used to describe the process of saving and investment. While the
standard neoclassical growth models of Solow (1956), Cass (1965), Koopmans (1965), and
Diamond (1965) lead to remarkably similar predictions with regards to the growth effects of
household’s savings behavior and investment decisions, they lead to diametrically opposed
predictions with regards to the growth effects of automation. Models of automation based
on Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965), in which households save a part of
their wage income and a part of their asset income, imply that automation could lead to
perpetual long-run growth even without (exogenous or endogenous) technological progress.
However, models of automation based on the canonical overlapping generations (OLG)
framework of Diamond (1965), in which households save exclusively out of wage income,
imply economic stagnation in the face of automation. The reason for the differential
effects of automation between the two types of underlying growth models is rooted in the
demographic structure and the implied timing of events in the OLG model. The generation
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that builds up its assets for retirement can save only out of wage income. The resulting
assets are in turn used to invest in standard physical capital and in automation. Since
automation is, by its very definition, a substitute for labor, its accumulation suppresses
wages and therefore diminishes the only source of investment. As a result, automation is
– in a sense – digging its own grave and preventing the takeoff to long-run growth in the
OLG economy.
Our second contribution is that we analyze the effects of a robot tax coupled with a
redistribution of the proceeds of the tax from robot income to labor income in the OLG
setting. We trace the effects of such a tax-transfer scheme on the steady-state capital stock
and therefore on steady-state per capita output. While we show that such a tax-transfer
scheme cannot overcome the stagnation steady state, it has a positive effect on the per
capita capital stock and on per capita output. In the potential implementation of such a
scheme, however, we argue that it is important to coordinate with other countries. The
reason is that moving capital to jurisdictions without robot taxes is easily done in a world
of open economies.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we sketch out the basic formulation of
the OLG model with automation, in Section 3 we analyze the equilibrium dynamics and
show that such a model necessarily leads to long-run stagnation. In Section 4 we analyze
the effects of a robot tax on the dynamics of the model and on the steady-state capital
stock. In Section 5 we summarize and draw conclusions for policy makers.
2 Automation in the canonical OLG framework
Consider an economy in which time t ∈ [0, 1 . . .∞) evolves discretely and households
live for three time periods, youth, adulthood, and retirement. Children do not make
any economic decisions and fulfill their needs via the consumption expenditures of their
parents. Adults supply their available time on the labor market for the market clearing
wage wt and save for retirement. Retirees do not work and finance their consumption
expenditures at old age out of their savings carried over from adulthood. The number of
children is denoted by n such that the evolution of the population size is exogenous and
given by Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt, where Nt refers to the size of the adult cohort at time t.
Following Diamond (1965), households derive utility from consumption in adulthood,
c1,t, and from consumption in retirement, c2,t+1. Assuming a logarithmic utility function
to guarantee analytical tractability and that households discount the future at rate ρ,
which implies a discount factor of β = 1/(1 + ρ), the household’s lifetime utility is given
by
Ut = log(c1,t) + β log(c2,t+1). (1)
Denoting the real interest rate on savings between time t and time t+1 by rt+1, the budget
3





where the left-hand side refers to discounted lifetime consumption expenditures and the
right-hand side to lifetime labor income. Solving the households’ intertemporal optimiza-
tion problem yields the consumption Euler equation
c2,t+1
c1,t
= β(1 + rt+1) (3)
describing the optimal individual consumption growth path for a given interest rate and a
given discount factor. From this expression and the budget constraint, optimal consump-








Note that adults consume and save a fraction of their wage income in the first period,
which allows them to build up assets for consumption when retired. However, young
adults do not yet have any asset income that they could save, which stands in contrast to
the models of Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965), where individuals start
to accumulate assets at the first moment of their life.
While the consumption side is identical to the standard canonical OLG model, the
production side changes in a fundamental way in the face of automation. There are
now three production factors: labor, which is supplied by adults on the labor market,
traditional physical capital in the form of machines, assembly lines, factory buildings,
etc., which is an imperfect substitute for labor, and automation capital in the form of
industrial robots, 3D printers, devices based on machine learning, etc., which is, by its
very definition, a perfect substitute for labor (see, for example, the definition of automation
in Merriam-Webster, 2017). When investing their savings, households can choose to buy
traditional physical capital or automation capital.




t (Nt + Pt)
1−α, (5)
where Yt denotes aggregate output (GDP), Kt denotes the stock of traditional physical
capital, Pt denotes the stock of automation capital, and α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output
with respect to traditional physical capital. This production function conceptualizes the
distinctive feature of automation capital as a perfect substitute for labor, which conforms
to its very definition.
We assume that there is perfect competition in goods and factor markets such that all
three production factors are paid their marginal value products. Using aggregate output
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as the nume´raire, the profits of the representative firm are given by
Πt = K
α
t (Nt + Pt)
1−α − wtNt −RktKt −RptPt, (6)
where Rkt is the rate of return on traditional physical capital and R
p
t is the rate of return
on automation capital. The first term on the right-hand side is the revenue of the rep-
resentative firm, whereas the last three terms are the costs of production in terms of the
wage bill (wtNt), the expenses for traditional physical capital (R
k
tKt), and the expenses for
automation capital (RptPt). Profit maximization then implies the following factor rewards
wt
!












We observe that, similar to the standard Diamond (1965) model, an increase in traditional
physical capital raises the wage rate because it raises the machine intensity of the economy
and therefore the productivity of workers. However, an increase in automation capital
has the opposite effect because automation capital competes closely with workers. As
a consequence, an increase in the stock of automation capital does not raise worker’s
productivity as measured by their marginal value product but renders the workers more
and more redundant.1
3 Equilibrium and main results
For low levels of the traditional capital stock and for low levels of automation capital,
Equations (7) and (8) imply
lim
Pt→0








This means that the Inada condition is not fulfilled for automation capital such that the
possibility of a corner solution emerges. If the traditional capital stock and the automation
capital stock are close to zero, individuals would only want to invest in the accumulation of
physical capital because its return is higher. Only later on, for a large enough traditional
physical capital stock, an interior equilibrium on the capital market becomes feasible.
For certain parameters, investments in both types of capital then yield the same rate of
return and individuals would start to accumulate both, traditional physical capital and
automation capital. Such an interior equilibrium of the capital market is characterized
by a no-arbitrage relationship between both types of investment implying that Rkt = R
p
t .
From this condition, the following relationship between Pt and Kt can be derived that
1Note that labor productivity as measured by GDP per worker increases for both an increase in Kt and
an increase in Pt. The reason is that an increase in both types of capital implies more production for a
given amount of labor input.
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The intuition behind this relationship is best illustrated by referring to Equations (7) and
(8): a higher stock of traditional physical capital (Kt) raises the rate of return on invest-
ment in automation capital (Pt) and reduces the rate of return on traditional physical
capital. Hence, the stock of automation capital has to rise in response to re-establish the
equality between the rates of return on traditional physical capital and on automation
capital. By contrast, a larger cohort size of adults (Nt) implies that there are more work-
ers available. In light of Equation (7), workers will have lower wages as a result such that
the incentives for automation are lower. This reduces the incentives to invest in automa-
tion capital, which leads to a reduction in its equilibrium stock (see also Abeliansky and
Prettner, 2017, for a theoretical consideration and for empirical support). The behavior of











which takes into account that households do not invest in automation capital if Equation
(10) is negative. In this case the production function collapses to the standard expression




t and, consequently, the steady-state
per capita capital stock and per capita income are constant.
To solve for the steady state that is associated with an interior equilibrium of the
capital market, we plug the no-arbitrage relationship (10) into the production function





where A ≡ (1 − α)/α. As is well-known, such a production structure usually leads to
perpetual growth because there are constant returns with respect to the accumulation
of physical capital (see, for example, Romer, 1986; Rebelo, 1991). As far as neoclassical
models of automation that admit a representative household along the lines of Solow
(1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) are concerned, there is indeed the possibility of
perpetual long-run growth for exactly this reason (see Steigum, 2011; Prettner, 2017). It is
important to note that this result holds true for a constant level of technology and it is not
the result of knowledge spillovers due to a learning-by-doing mechanism. Instead, it follows
directly from the feature of automation that it is a substitute for labor, which prevents
the diminishing returns from capital accumulation from kicking in. As a consequence, the
standard neoclassical convergence mechanism toward a steady state in which the economy
stagnates is not operative.
As we show next, the fact that our OLG model with automation exhibits an AK-type
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of technology in case of an interior capital market equilibrium does not imply sustained
growth. This stands in sharp contrast to the described findings of Steigum (2011) and
Prettner (2017) for the representative agent neoclassical growth model with automation.
Since the economy is closed and we follow the standard practice in OLG models by as-
suming that both types of capital fully depreciate over the course of one generation, the
aggregate stock of assets at time t + 1 is determined by investment in period t. This
implies that we have the following law of motion for the aggregate stock of assets
St = stNt
!








We are now at the stage at which we can define a competitive equilibrium of the
economy in case of an interior capital market equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a sequence {Kt, Pt, c1,t, c2,t, Rt, Rkt , Rpt , wt}∞t=0,
such that {Rt, Rkt , Rpt , wt}∞t=0 satisfy (7), (8), and Rt = Rkt = Rpt , {c1,t, c2,t}∞t=0 satisfy
(3) and (4), {Kt, Pt}∞t=0 satisfy (10) and (13), and {Nt}∞t=0 satisfies the population growth
equation Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt.
Dividing Equation (13) by the size of the adult cohort Nt+1 and plugging in the
aggregate production function (5) and the no-arbitrage condition (10), we arrive at the
steady-state capital-labor ratio of the economy as given by kt+1 = kt = k with












It is immediately clear that there is no growth in the capital-labor ratio because the right-
hand side of Equation (14) consists of constant parameters. In this situation we know
from inspecting Equation (12) that GDP per capita stagnates and there is no potential
for long-run economic growth. We summarize our main finding on the long-run growth
effects of automation in the canonical OLG economy in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the canonical overlapping generations model with automation and an
interior capital market equilibrium, where both traditional physical capital and automation
capital are accumulated:
i) the production structure resembles the properties of an AK type of growth model;
ii) the accumulation of automation capital reduces wages and therefore the savings/
investments of households;
iii) the economy is trapped in a stagnation equilibrium because of the feedback effect
between automation and wages.
This proposition implies that, in contrast to the standard neoclassical growth models
with a representative agent, the economy necessarily stagnates in the canonical OLG
model even if agents invest in both types of capital. The reason is that investment is fully
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financed out of wage income as implied by (4). However, wage income itself is reduced
by automation. In a sense, automation is therefore digging its own grave in the OLG
model. This result provides an analytical explanation for the numerical findings of Sachs
and Kotlikoff (2012), Benzell et al. (2015), and Sachs et al. (2015) in the simplest possible
OLG model that allows for closed-form solutions. In the following remark, we provide the
solution for the model with exogenously growing technology. The main intuition does not
change in the sense that automation does not represent an additional engine of growth on
top of technological progress in such a setting.
Remark 1. When we allow for labor-augmenting technological progress, the production
function is given by
Yt = K
α
t (AtNt + Pt)
1−α, (15)
where technology evolves according to At+1 = (1 + g)At with A0 = 1 and g > 0. In this
case the effective capital-labor ratio k˜ ≡ K/AL is given by












at the steady state. In this case, per capita variables grow along a balanced growth path at
the rate of technological progress, g. For g = 0, Equation (16) collapses to Equation (14)
and the economy is back in the stagnation steady state. In the case with positive long-run
growth, our result holds true in the sense that automation does not represent an additional
engine for long-run economic growth besides technological progress.
4 The effects of a robot tax
A natural question that emerges in our context is the extent to which redistribution policies
can affect the impact of automation on the economy. In particular, a tax on robots is often
referred to as a solution to mitigate some of the negative consequences of automation. For
example, Bill Gates stated in an interview in 2017 that “[. . . ]taxation is certainly a better
way to handle it than just banning some elements of it.” Gates also mentions how such
a tax could be designed: “Some of it can come on the profits that are generated by the
labor-saving efficiency there. Some of it can come directly in some type of robot tax.”
(Delaney, 2017). Furthermore, some governments and even the European Parliament are
ventilating ideas about a robot tax (see, for example Prodhan, 2017). In the context of
our model, it might be straightforward to conjecture that a tax on the income generated
by robots and an associated redistribution of the proceeds of the tax toward workers who
do not own assets could raise aggregate savings and enable the asset-poor parts of the
population to participate in the gains that automation brings about. While we show that
such a scheme is not effective in overcoming stagnation, the level of per capita income can
be affected in case of the steady state that is associated with an interior capital market
equilibrium.
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To conceptualize the tax-transfer scheme, we examine lump-sum transfers to the work-
ing age adults denoted by τ¯t, which are financed by a tax on the use of automation capital
for firms (the robot tax) at rate τ ∈ [0, 1]. The budget constraint of households in the




= wt + τ¯t, (17)
where the lump-sum redistribution adds to the wage rate. The solution of the modified




(wt + τ¯t), st =
β
1 + β
(wt + τ¯t). (18)
The profit function of the representative firm in case of the tax-subsidy scheme becomes
Πt = K
α
t (Nt + Pt)
1−α − wtNt −RktKt − (1 + τ)RptPt, (19)
which takes into account that a robot tax increases the expenses of the employment of
robots versus other types of machines. As a consequence, τ distorts the no-arbitrage
condition between using traditional physical capital Kt and automation capital Pt in favor
of using traditional capital Kt.









Altogether, the steady-state per capita capital stock in case of the tax-transfer scheme














It is easy to see that, in case of τ = 0, Equation (21) collapses to the steady-state per
capita capital stock of the original model as given by Equation (14). At that stage we can
state the following result with respect to the effects of the tax-subsidy scheme.
Proposition 2. In the canonical overlapping generations model with automation and an
interior capital market equilibrium, where both traditional physical capital and automation
capital are accumulated:
i) a robot tax is not effective in overcoming stagnation;
ii) a robot tax raises per capita capital and thereby per capita income at the steady state.
Proof. Part i) of the proposition follows immediately from inspecting Equation (21), which
is constant.
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For part ii), note that the derivative of the steady-state per capita capital stock with

























]α − (1 + β)(1 + n) (1 + τ) (1 + ατ)}2 > 0. (22)
Since we have that α and τ are both between zero and one, it is easily seen that the numer-
ator in both terms on the right-hand side is positive. From the fact that the denominator
is squared, it then follows that the whole derivative is always positive. Consequently, the
robot tax raises per capita capital and per capita output at the steady state.
Altogether, we see that the robot tax has the potential to raise per capita capital
and per capita output at the steady state of the canonical OLG model with automation.
However, it has to be cautioned that this result is only derived for a closed economy, where
capital in either form cannot move abroad. In an open economy setting, the robot tax
faces the same difficulty as a tax on financial transactions (the “Tobin Tax”) in the sense
that it is very easy to move a mobile production factor to a jurisdiction that does not
impose such a tax. A successful implementation of a robot tax then depends on whether
or not it is implemented by many countries. In this sense the results of our model could
be interpreted to hold for a large entity such as all OECD countries taken together. In
case of a joint introduction of the tax in all OECD countries, there might indeed be gains
in terms of per capita income.
5 Conclusions
We demonstrate that the canonical OLG model of Diamond (1965) implies economic
stagnation even in the face of automation. This holds true despite the fact that the
overall production structure resembles the properties of an AK growth model without the
diminishing returns of physical capital that are responsible for the standard well-known
convergence mechanisms toward a steady-state equilibrium. The reason for stagnation
is that, in this framework, households exclusively save out of their labor income. By
definition, however, automation competes with labor and depresses the wage rate and
therefore labor income. This reduces the savings and investment potential of households
and prevents the economy from growing. Our results explain the numerical findings of
Sachs and Kotlikoff (2012), Benzell et al. (2015), and Sachs et al. (2015) in the simplest
analytically tractable setting. However, the results also illustrate that the phenomenon of
stagnation in the presence of automation is not generalizable to other models of capital
accumulation in which households also re-invest a fraction of their asset incomes.
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We also analyze the effects of a robot tax in this setting and show that it has the
potential to raise per capita capital and per capita output at the steady state. However,
it cannot overcome the stagnation of the economy. Furthermore, in a realistic setting, the
successful implementation of a robot tax is only feasible if it done many countries because
of the possibility that capital of either form just moves to jurisdictions in which there
is no robot tax. This calls for a strong international collaboration when considering the
introduction of robot taxes.
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